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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kevin Allen Boyce appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation and imposing sentence of ten years with three years fixed upon his 
guilty plea to felony burglary. Boyce asserts the district court abused its 
discretion, and contends the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to 
augment the record with transcripts of various proceedings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Kevin Allen Boyce pleaded guilty to felony burglary, and the district court 
sentenced him to a term of ten years with three years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 34-35.) At Boyce's rider review hearing, the district court 
suspended execution of judgment and ordered probation for five years, subject 
to conditions. (R., pp. 39, 43-47.) Less than two months later, the district court 
issued a bench warrant for Boyce's arrest for violating probation. (R., pp. 54-57.) 
Boyce admitted probation violations, and the district court revoked probation and 
executed the previously imposed sentence of ten years with three years fixed. 
(R., pp. 67, 69-70.) 
Boyce now timely appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion 
in imposing an excessive sentence. Boyce also asserts the Supreme Court 
denied him due process and equal protection when it denied his motion to 
augment the appellate record. 
1 
ISSUES 
Kevin Allen Boyce states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process 
and equal protection when it [denied] his motion to augment 
the appellate record with transcripts necessary for review of 
the issues on appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked 
probation and issue[d] an excessive sentence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
[Boyce's) Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A 
Reduction Of Sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Boyce failed to show a right to review of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
order denying his motion to augment in which, in any event, the Court 
properly found Boyce was not denied due process or equal protection 
rights? 
2. Has Boyce failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing a sentence within statutory limits and upon Boyce's admission to 




Boyce Has Failed To Show A Right To Review Of The Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Denying His Motion To Augment In Which. In Any Event. The Court 
Properly Found Boyce Was Not Denied Due Process Or Equal Protection Rights 
A. The Idaho Court Of Appeals Lacks Authority To Review The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Decision Denying The Motion To Augment 
On appeal, Boyce requested transcripts from his June 2011 change of 
plea and rider review hearings, which the Idaho Supreme Court denied. (9/5/12 
Order.) In his brief on appeal, Boyce argues that the Court's denial of 
augmentation with these transcripts violates his right to due process and equal 
protection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-18.) As an initial matter, if this case is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals, Boyce has no right to review of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision under Idaho case law. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals cannot directly review a decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Rather, it may only grant an independent motion based on new 
information "or a new or expanded basis for the motion." State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). Boyce makes clear here that 
he is not renewing his motion, but challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial 
of the motion. (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Boyce has identified no legal authority 
allowing such review by the Idaho Court of Appeals. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
recently rejected an appellant's attempt to seek review of the Idaho Supreme 
Court's denial of a nearly identical issue in State v. Cornelison, 2013 WL 
1613842 (Ct. App. 2013). If this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, 
existing case law supports rejection of Boyce's argument. 
3 
B. The Supreme Court Properly Denied Boyce's Initial Motion 
Even if the Court were to entertain Boyce's request for review of the order 
denying motion to augment, Boyce has failed to show a legal basis to reverse 
the Court's decision. Under Idaho case law, Boyce's due process and equal 
protection rights were not violated. 
A defendant is denied due process or equal protection if he has been 
denied "a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the 
errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 
P.3d at 838 (citations omitted). Although the record on appeal is not confined to 
those facts arising between sentencing and the probation revocation appealed, 
id. (citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009)), it 
need not include "a// proceedings in the trial court up to and including 
sentencing." kl (emphasis original). Rather, the appellate court will consider 
those elements of the trial court record relevant to the probation revocation 
issues and that are properly part of the appellate record. kl 
The appellate rules designating those records necessary for appellate 
review afford all process due an appellant. kl at 838-39 (citing I.A.R. 28(a), 
29(a), 30). The fact that the appellate court denies an appellant's motion to 
augment does not show a violation of due process. Under Morgan, the appellate 
court need only admit those parts of the record below that were germane to the 
trial court's probation revocation decision. kl Specifically, the Morgan court 
said, "This Court will not assume the omitted transcripts would support the 
district court's revocation order since they were not before the district court in the 
[final) probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication 
4 
that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those 
prior hearings." ~ at 838. 
As in Morgan, the district court here gave no indication that its decision 
revoking Boyce's probation and imposing his sentence was based on information 
provided in prior hearings but not provided in his final disposition hearing. 
(5/10/12 Tr.) The transcript reflects instead that the court revoked Boyce's 
probation based on information before the court. (5/10/12 Tr., p. 18, L. 10 - p. 
20, L. 5.) 
At Boyce's July 2011 sentencing hearing, the court commented that 
Boyce is educated and intelligent with the ability to be successful, and wished 
him luck, noting, "this is an opportunity for you to turn it around." (7/15/11 Tr., p. 
26, Ls. 6-24.) At the disposition hearing on Boyce's probation violation, the court 
addressed Boyce, stating simply, 
Mr. Boyce, when I sent you on the rider and then reinstated your 
probation, I made clear what would happen if following a rider you 
violated the terms and conditions of your probation. And you 
violated those terms and conditions significantly. 
(5/10/12 Tr., p. 24, L. 21 - p. 25, L. 1; see 5/10/12 Tr., p. 17, L. 23- p. 18, L. 3 
(court had warned that failure to abide by conditions would result in imposition of 
underlying sentence); R., p. 47.) The court then imposed the same sentence 
previously imposed. (R., p. 70.) The appellate record leaves no mystery as to 
the district court's rationale. 
Boyce tries to distinguish Morgan, noting that he challenges the length of 
his sentence in addition to his probation revocation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-
15.) In support, Boyce cites Idaho cases holding that a court is entitled to use 
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knowledge learned from its official position and observations in imposing 
sentence. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 12-131.) Thus, Boyce appears to contend 
that, because the court was entitled to use information learned in prior 
proceedings at sentencing, transcripts from those proceedings are relevant. But 
the mere assertion that the transcripts are relevant does not make them so. 
Boyce essentially relies on two propositions: that the entire record of 
proceedings is relevant, and that a transcript need not be "before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing" in order to be relevant. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.) As already discussed, these propositions were 
explicitly rejected in Morgan. Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 838. Boyce 
fails to reconcile Morgan with his arguments. And nothing in Morgan supports 
that its holdings apply only to an appeal of a probation revocation, but not to an 
appeal of a defendant's sentence. 
Except for Boyce's self-serving assertions, he fails to show that his 
requested transcripts are relevant. Absent any relevance, Boyce fails to 
demonstrate how exclusion of the transcripts from his appellate record hinders 
his counsel's ability to provide effective assistance. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 
16-18.) Accordingly, Boyce's due process argument fails. 
Regarding Boyce's equal protection claim, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review 
1 Citing Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Sivak, 
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984 ); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-
56 (Ct. App. 1989). 
6 
as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591 (1956). However, the state need only provide 
"adequate and effective appellate review," or those portions of the record 
necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Jg_. at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 591. An 
indigent appellant has a right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings," or a 
record "complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims." 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121-23, 117 S.Ct. 555, 566-67 (1996). 
Because Boyce has not demonstrated that the transcripts are relevant to 
the issues here, he also fails to show they are needed for adequate and effective 
appellate review. 2 Accordingly, this Court should find that its initial denial of 
Boyce's motion was correct. 
11. 
Boyce Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Imposing 
A Sentence Within Statutory Limits And Upon Boyce's Admission To Probation 
Violations, Or In Denying His Request To Reduce Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Boyce argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an 
excessive sentence and in denying his request to reduce the sentence. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-24.) Boyce fails to meet his burden on this appeal, of 
showing the court abused its discretion. 
22 Boyce's remaining arguments on this issue fail because the Idaho statutes and 
rules he cites are inapplicable. Idaho Code § 1-1105(2) does not apply because 
it concerns transcripts ordered by the court. Idaho Code § 19-863(a) does not 
apply because it pertains to necessary transcripts. And Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
applies to the district court for purposes of trial, not to this Court on appeal. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A factual finding related to sentencing will not be set aside on appeal if it 
is supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 
271, 278-79, 1 P.3d 299, 306-07 (2000). Also, factual findings made at 
sentencing must be accepted on appeal unless shown to be clearly erroneous. 
State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 688, 991 P.2d 870, 876 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Where a district court's discretionary decision is "tainted by ... factual error, the 
appropriate appellate response ordinarily is to remand for a proper exercise of 
discretion, free of error." State v. McDonald, 124 Idaho 103, 107, 856 P.2d 893, 
897 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). "However, a remand may be avoided if it 
is plain from the judge's own expressed reasoning that the result would not 
change." !sL (emphasis omitted). 
As to an abuse of discretion claim, the appellate court will not disturb a 
sentence that is within statutory limits absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. 
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). 
Boyce does not dispute that his sentence was within statutory limits. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 20.) In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers 
whether the district court (1) was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted 
within the scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) 
reached its decision through exercise of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011). 
To meet his burden on appeal, Boyce must show his sentence is 
excessive "under any reasonable view of the facts," considering the objectives of 
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criminal punishment: protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution or punishment. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313. In 
reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court independently 
reviews the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's 
character. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) 
(citation omitted). Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a 
sentence is excessive, the appellate court will not disturb it. State v. Miller, 151 
Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (citation omitted). 
C. Boyce Has Not Shown His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any Reasonable 
View Of The Facts 
Boyce asserts that his sentence of ten years with three years fixed is 
excessive in light of his expressed remorse, and his lack of a prior felony. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21.) According to Boyce, his probation violations were 
attributable to "miscommunication between Mr. Boyce and his probation officer, 
and the fact that he was homeless." (Appellant's brief, p. 21 (citing 5/10/12 Tr., 
pp. 22-23).) Boyce admitted to violating probation terms two, three, six, and 
eight. (4/19/12 Tr., p. 1, Ls. 12-14; p. 15, Ls. 7-9.) Those terms required him to: 
(2) apply for vocation rehabilitation services; (3) attend or successfully complete 
moral recognition therapy; (6) report to supervising probation officer; and (8) 
maintain (not abscond from) supervision. (4/19/12 Tr., p. 2, L. 14- p. 3, L. 4; R., 
pp. 51-52.) 
Boyce's admissions, from both his admit/deny and disposition hearing, do 
not reflect a "miscommunication" at all. According to Boyce, he was kicked out 
of clean and sober housing because someone there smelled Nyquil on his 
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breath and mistook it for non-medicinal alcohol. (4/19/12 Tr., p. 12, L. 19 - p. 
13, L. 12.) But from there, Boyce failed to report to his probation officer, failed to 
explain to the officer his inability to pay for required moral recognition therapy 
course, failed to explain why he did not keep his appointment with the officer. 
(4/19/12 Tr., p. 13, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 3.) In the district court's words, Boyce "took 
a bad situation and made it worse." (4/19/12 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 4-5.) About this 
description, Boyce responded, "Yes, sir." (4/19/12 Tr., p. 15, L. 6.) 
Boyce also expressed frustration with being told to "go apply for jobs at 
Taco Bell when he has got all this computer experience." (5/10/12 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 
4-7.) This demonstrated reluctance to accept responsibility is hardly mitigating 
evidence warranting a shorter sentence. Instead, it supports that Boyce is ill-
prepared for second, third, or fourth chances. 
Condition 22, which the court read aloud at disposition provided, "Failure 
to abide by the conditions of probation resulting in a motion for probation 
violation will if proven or admitted be considered a violation of a fundamental 
condition of probation which will result in imposition of the underlying sentence." 
(5/10/12 Tr., p. 17, L. 23 - p. 18, L. 3.) The court advised Boyce that it had 
reviewed the file and reports, and considered the court's sentencing discretion as 
well as Boyce's character and mitigating and aggravating factors. (5/10/12 Tr., p. 
24, Ls. 14-16.) The court further advised that it considered "the objectives of 
protecting society and achieving deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution or 
punishment." (5/10/12 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 16-20.) 
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Based on Boyce's violations, both admitted and as found by the court, the 
court executed the sentence of ten years with three fixed. (5/10/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 
2-6.) This was the underlying sentence, nothing more, and he was given 293 
days credit for time served against the fixed portion. (5/10/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 4-8.) 
Under any reasonable view of the facts in this case, Boyce's sentence was 
appropriate. Even where a reasonable view of the facts could support a lesser 
sentence, such difference in interpretation does not justify disturbing the district 
court's sentence on review. Accordingly, Boyce has failed to show the district 
court abused its discretion in imposing sentence or denying his request to reduce 
sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the order denying 
motion to augment the appellate record, and the district court's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013. 
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